Offline dictionary attack on a universally composable three-party password-based key exchange protocol  by Yuan, Wei et al.
Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 1691 – 1694
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2011.08.315
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Procedia
Engineering
   Procedia Engineering  00 (2011) 000–000
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
Advanced in Control Engineeringand Information Science 
Offline dictionary attack on a universally composable three-
party password-based key exchange protocol 
Wei Yuan, Liang Hu, Hongtu Li, Jianfeng Chu*a
aCollege of Computer Science and Technology, Jilin University, Changchun, 130012 , China 
Abstract 
Key exchange protocols are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public networks. Password-based 
key exchange protocols allow parties to share a secret key in an authentic manner based on an easily memorizable password. 
Recently, Deng et al. proposed a three-party password-based key exchange protocol in the universal composable framework in 
China Communications, where two users, each one of whom shares a human-memorable password with a trusted server, can 
authenticate each other and compute a secure session key. In this letter, we show that Deng et al.’s protocol is insecure against
offline dictionary attack by any other client. Hence, the protocol doesn’t achieve their aim. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
Password-based authenticated key exchange protocols are important cryptographic tools in secure 
communications and have been widely used in many online websites. Among numerous authentication 
schemes, the password-based authenticated key agreement protocols require users only to remember a 
human-memorable low-entropy password and share it with a trusted server. When two users want to 
establish a shared session key, they resort to the trusted server to authenticate each other; it is rather 
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simple and efficient. Therefore, it has attracted much attention and a lot of three-party authenticated key 
exchange protocols have been proposed [1]. 
The first known password-based authenticated key agreement protocol is due to Bellovin and Merritt 
[2]. This concept has also been extended to the three-party case [3] and the group case [4]. Nowadays, 
most on-line services over the Internet are based on the client/server architecture, such as Kerberos and 
KryptoKnight [5]. In this architecture, there is a single server to serve a lot of clients. Authentication is 
basic and is the first step to identify whether a remote client is authorized or not. After the verification of 
the identity, the client can be held accountable and the system can decide to give a specific access 
privilege. Hence the password-based authenticated key agreement protocols are well suited for the 
client/server architectures. 
Due to their simplicity and efficiency, the password-based protocols suffer from various kinds of 
security problems. T. Kwon et al. [6] proposed an improved password-based authentication protocol; 
SeongHan SHIN et al. [7] showed an impersonation attack on that protocol. Wen et al. [8] proposed a 
provably secure Three Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol using Weil pairings; 
Nam et al. [9] pointed out that protocol could not resist the man-in-the-middle attack. Lu and Cao [10] 
presented a simple three-party key exchange protocol; an online dictionary attack was found by Guo et al. 
[11]. Besides the man-in-the-middle attack, which is a key threat to the DH key agreement protocol [12], 
the main attacks on password-based key agreement protocols include two kinds as below: 
1. Undetectable online dictionary attack: an attacker tries to verify the password in an online manner 
without being detected. That is, a failed guess is never noticed by the server and the client, and the 
attacker can legally and undetectably check many times in order to get sufficient information of the 
password. 
2. Offline dictionary attack: an attacker uses a guessed password to verify the correctness of the 
password in an offline manner. The attacker can freely guess a password and then check if it is correct 
without limitation in the number of guesses. 
Recently, Deng et al. [13] proposed a three party password-based key exchange protocol based on 
reference [14, 15] and declared their protocol was secure under the universal composable framework 
(UC-SECURE) and was the minimum among the published works. In this letter, we find that their 
protocol is insecure against offline dictionary attack and proposed a detailed instance to attack their 
scheme. 
2. Brief Review of the UC-SECURE 3PKE protocol 
In Deng et al.’s protocol, E=(E,D) is a symmetric encryption scheme, h is a pseudorandom function, 
G = <g> is a finite cyclic group of order a l-bit prime number q, M, N are two elements in G, where the 
operation is denoted multiplicatively. The system contains two kinds of roles: The trustedserver PT and 
the users. One user may be an initiator or a responder when they participate in the protocol. At the 
beginning, PT should broadcast his identity sid to all the users and wait for users’ requests. The protocol is 
described as follows: 
1. When a user Pi (called the initiator) wants to initiate a key exchange process with another user Pj
(called responder), he sends a notice , which stands for the two users’ requesting the key 
exchange service, chooses a random exponent x and computes the value 
( , , )i j Tpid P P P=
ipwxX g M= ⋅ , then sends (flow-
one, X) to Pj.
2. When Pj, who was waiting for a flow-one message, receives a message (flow-one, X) from Pi, he 
chooses a random exponent y and computes the value jpwyY g N= ⋅ . Then he sends (flow-two, X, Y) to 
PT.
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3. When PT receives a message (flow-two, X, Y) from Pj, he chooses a random exponent z and computes 
|| (( ) )
j
i
pw z
i sid pwU E Y N= , || (( ) )ij
pw z
j sid pwU E X M= . Then PT sends (flow-three, Ui) and (flow-three, Uj)
to Pi and Pj respectively. 
4a. When Pi receives a message (flow-three, Ui) from PT, he gets the secret value ( j
pw )zY N by decrypting 
the ciphertext Ui. Then it computes the Diffie-Hellman secret value (( ) )j
pw z x x
i
yzK Y N g= =
)i
, the session 
key ( || || ||i i jsk h sid P P K= , and terminates the session. 
4b. When Pj receives a message (flow-three, Uj) from PT, he gets the secret value ( )ipw zX M  by 
decrypting the ciphertext Uj. Then it computes the Diffie-Hellman secret value (( ) )ipw z y xj
yzK X M g= = ,
the session key ( || || || )j i j jsk h sid P P K= , and terminates the session. 
3. Offline Dictionary Attack on the protocol 
1. jP informs that and he is going to start a key exchange process. Then he selects two random exponents r and 
y, computes
TP iP
rX M= , jpwyY M N= ⋅ , and sends (flow-two, X, Y) to .TP
2. Upon receiving (flow-two, X, Y), selects a random exponent z, 
computes
TP
|| ||(( ) ) ( )
j
i i
pw z yz
i sid pw sid pwU E Y N E M= = ,
( )
||id p ||(( ) ) ( )i ij j
pw z r pwz
j s w sid pwU E X M E M
−
= = , and sends 
(flow-three, ) and (flow-three, ) to and .iU jU iP jP
3. jP intercepts or eavesdrops (flow-three, ). Note, even ifiU jP fails to intercept (flow-three, ) and may detect 
only once that is invalid, it does not mean that detects this attack and can not find that he is being attacked. 
Then he computes 
iU iP
iU TP iP
( )
||
i
j
z r pw ( )sid pw jM D
−
= U with the message (flow-three, jU
( i
), and gets .
Next, he repeats to guess a password  to decrypt ,
( ) ( )( )i iz r pw y− −=yz r pwM M
'
1pw iU
'yz
'||
)
isid pw
M D U
pw
=
iP
 for an unknown , and checks until 
the equation holds. Finally,  gets ’s password .
'z
''
1 ( )( )( ) iyz r pwr pwM M −− =yz jP
'
1 1pw=
4. Discussion 
In this article, we have shown that Deng et al.’s password-based key exchange protocol suffers from 
offline dictionary attack. Due to the public algebraic structure exchanged between the server and the 
client, any password-based key exchange protocols can not prevent adversaries from forging the 
intermediate message like X, Y, Ui, Uj. However, the main reason that our attack succeeds is that the 
intermediate messages which contain the encrypted password are not proper protected so that the attacker 
can verify whether the password he guessed correctly or not using the result feedback from the server. 
Thus, to avoid this problem, the server should make sure that the message sent from a user is unique to 
that user. Namely, only the server can authenticate the user, the useful message with encrypted key won’t 
be revealed and our proposed attack is invalid. 
As a conclusion, we can say, to prevent offline dictionary, the server should have the ability to 
authenticate that the encrypted message is unique to that user. The potential offline dictionary attack may 
exist on any password based protocols without authentication. 
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